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 Quasi-realism about the normative is the project of starting with an expressivist account of simple 
normative sentences such as “Kicking dogs is wrong” and from those meager resources earning back our 
right to more complex, realist-sounding discourse such as “If it’s true that kicking dogs is wrong, then it 
must also be true that kicking cats is wrong.” Many keys have been typed over the fortunes of this program. 
But it appears to have gone unnoticed that there is an important lacuna in the program as it exists today. 
The goals of this chapter are to identify that lacuna (§1), to make a proposal about the best way to fill it (§2), 
and finally to note a problem for the proposal I develop (§3). 
1. A Lacuna 
Although quasi-realism aims to be an account of both normative thought and normative talk, I shall follow the 
common practice of focusing primarily on what it says about the latter. Quasi-realists start by providing an 
expressivist treatment of simple normative sentences along the following lines: 
(E1) To (sincerely) say, “Kicking dogs is wrong,” is to express state of mind M, 
where M is a “desire-like” or “intention-esque” or “non-representational” attitude (for short: an attitude). 
Having offered an account of what we are up to when we utter simple normative sentences, quasi-realists 
go on to provide similar treatments of more complicated sentences that it is sometimes thought only realists 
can make sense of, such as: 
(1) It’s true that kicking dogs is wrong. 
(2) If kicking dogs is wrong, then kicking cats is wrong. 
(3) Kicking cans is not wrong. 
(4) I think kicking trees is wrong, but I might be mistaken about that. 
(5) It’s not the case that (kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it). 
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 Notice the last item on this list. Accounting for thought and talk about the mind-independence of 
normative matters has, from its inception, been a central aim of the quasi-realist project, for two reasons. 
First, claims of mind-independence are among those supposed hallmarks of realist speech that quasi-realists 
have sought to provide an account of, thereby showing these claims not to be hallmarks of realist speech 
after all. Second, providing an account of what statements of mind-independence mean is an essential step 
in quasi-realist attempts to fend off the perennial complaint that their view is objectionably “subjectivistic.” 
Consider the classic Euthyphro question: is kicking dogs wrong because we disapprove of it, or do we 
disapprove of it because it is wrong? It’s tempting to suppose that expressivists must respond to this dilemma 
by accepting its first horn, thereby committing themselves to kicking dogs being wrong because of our 
attitudes. It’s also tempting to suppose that avoiding the dilemma by accepting its second horn is a mark of 
realism: that precisely what distinguishes realism from other metanormative positions is its distinctive 
answer to the Euthyphro question. But if quasi-realists can provide an account of what we are up to when 
we say sentence (5) that allows them to sincerely utter those words without reneging on their commitment 
to expressivism, then both of these tempting thoughts are mistaken: expressivists need not embrace the first 
horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, and embracing the second horn does not make one a realist. 
 As is often the case with quasi-realism, ur-quasi-realist Simon Blackburn has set the agenda here. 
Blackburn’s general strategy for handling claims of mind-independence—which most other quasi-realists, 
including Allan Gibbard, endorse as well—can be broken up into four steps.1 First, Blackburn takes a typical 
statement of mind-dependence such as 
(6) Kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it 
to be equivalent to the following subjunctive conditional: 
(7) If we didn’t disapprove of kicking dogs, then doing so wouldn’t be wrong. 
Second, Blackburn invokes his quasi-realist account of subjunctive conditionals to tell us the state of mind 
expressed by sincere utterances of (7). (Exactly which state of mind that is need not concern us.) Third, 
                                                   
1  See Blackburn 1981, 179–80; 1984, 217–19; 1993, 152–53, 172–74; 1998, 74, 296, 311–12; 2010, 32–33, 111–13; Gibbard 
1990, 164–66. 
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Blackburn invokes his quasi-realist account of negation to tell us the state of mind expressed by sincere 
utterances of (7)’s negation—which, given the equivalence of (6) and (7), will be the same state of mind 
expressed by sincere utterances of (5). Fourth, Blackburn argues that the quasi-realist can consistently assert 
(5) by making a quietist move. He points out that, given the quasi-realist account of their meaning, (5) and 
(6) both qualify as “first-order,” “internal,” or “normative” statements within ethics, rather than “second-
order,” “external,” or “metaethical” statements about ethics. As Blackburn puts it, “Talk of dependency is 
moral talk or nothing” (1993, 173). Moreover, Blackburn insists, (6) is a piece of moral talk that is 
repugnant—he opposes the state of mind it expresses—whereas (5) is a perfectly admirable bit of moral 
talk—he favors the state of mind it expresses. Thus Blackburn denies (6) and assents to (5), and he trusts the 
same is true of other quasi-realists as well. 
 Critical responses to Blackburn’s account of mind-independence have almost exclusively focused 
on this final step. The standard objection is that Blackburn is neglecting an external/metaethical way of 
reading (6) to which quasi-realists are committed, even if he is correct that quasi-realists can deny (6) when 
it is given an internal/normative-ethical reading.2 Moreover, there is room to resist the second and third 
steps of Blackburn’s proposal, insofar as they rely on contentious parts of the wider quasi-realist program. 
After all, providing a quasi-realist account of subjunctive conditionals with normative content is just as 
difficult as providing an account of indicative conditionals with normative content. (That’s why Blackburn’s 
stories about both have changed over the years.) And, of course, there are well-known challenges facing 
quasi-realist accounts of negation. 
 However, there is a more fundamental flaw with Blackburn’s account of mind-independence. The 
key problem arises during its very first step. It is simply not true that “Kicking dogs is wrong because we 
disapprove of it” (= “p because q”) has the same meaning as “If we didn’t disapprove of kicking dogs, then 
doing so wouldn’t be wrong” (= “~q £® ~p”). As it is put these days, grounding is not counterfactual 
                                                   
2  See, for instance, Rasmussen 1985, Cassam 1986, and Moore 2002; for a reply, see Köhler 2014. For a different sort of 
objection to the final step in Blackburn’s account of mind-independence, see Zangwill 1994; for a reply, see Sinclair 2008. 
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covariation.3 The counterexamples here are plentiful, and well known.4 For instance, to adapt an old 
example of Michael DePaul’s (1987), suppose hedonistic act-utilitarianism is correct, and A is an act that 
maximizes happiness (and hence is required). Then the following are all true: 
(8) If A didn’t maximize happiness, then it wouldn’t be required. 
(9) If A weren’t required, then it wouldn’t maximize happiness. 
(10) A is required because it maximizes happiness. 
But the following is false: 
(11) A maximizes happiness because it is required. 
In other words, we have counterfactual covariation in both directions, but grounding/dependence in only 
one direction. So “p because q” is not even coextensive with “~q £® ~p,” much less are the two equivalent 
in meaning.5 
 Because of their mistaken identification of grounding with counterfactual covariation, quasi-realists 
have, so far, failed to provide us with an account of what talk of mind-dependence comes to. They have told 
us what counterfactuals such as (7) mean, but they have not told us what dependency claims such as (6) 
mean. Indeed, the problem is worse than that. It’s not just talk of the ways in which the normative might 
depend on the mental that quasi-realists have neglected, but moreover talk of any sort of a dependence (or 
grounding, or non-causal explanation) relation between normative and other matters, mental or otherwise. 
Quasi-realism as developed by Blackburn and his allies does not even have a story to tell about what (10) 
means. They currently lack an account of normative ‘grounding’-talk all together, whether formulated using 
the expressions ‘because’, ‘grounds’, ‘depends on’, ‘in virtue of’, ‘makes the case’, or any of the other 
                                                   
3  Actually, the point is more often summarized as the claim that grounding is not counterfactual dependence, but in my opinion 
the very examples which demonstrate the point also show that so-called “counterfactual dependence” is no form of dependence at 
all. For that reason I prefer to talk of counterfactual covariation. 
4  See Berker 2018, §§2–3, for a survey. 
5  Could Blackburn resist this argument by only taking (6) to entail (7) and giving up on the converse entailment, which is all 
DePaul’s counterexample directly targets? Perhaps all quasi-realists need in order to show they are not committed to moral mind-
dependence is the claim that (6) entails (7), together with a rejection of (7) in favor of its negation. However, there are three problems 
with this reply. First, quasi-realists not only want to avoid a commitment to moral mind-dependence, but also seek to provide an 
account of what talk of mind-dependence come to, and this reply does not help them with the latter task. Second, without such an 
account it is not clear why quasi-realists should think that (6) entails (7). And, third, cases of metaphysical overdetermination and of 
metaphysical preemption (among others) cast doubt on the claim that (6) does in fact entail (7). 
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standard idioms. And insofar as everyday speech is rife with talk of what makes acts right or wrong, why 
people are praise- or blameworthy, in virtue of what our institutions are just or unjust, this oversight is a 
serious lacuna in the quasi-realist program. 
2. A Proposal 
There is hope, though. There exists a natural expressivist-friendly account of normative ‘because’-talk that 
quasi-realists can embrace without conflating grounding and counterfactual covariation. 
 The key to this account is a contrast between two different uses of the word ‘because’. First, there 
is the use of ‘because’ that has been our main focus so far, namely its use in sentences that express non-
causal explanations of one sort or another, as in 
(12) That act is required because it maximizes happiness. 
(13) That banner is red because it is crimson. 
(14) Xanthippe is a widow because Socrates died. 
I will call this first use the ‘because’ of grounding, since ‘grounding’ is the standard term among metaphysicians 
for the sort of ‘because’-relation (I will be assuming it is a relation) picked out by sentences such as these. 
Second, there is the use of ‘because’ in sentences that express rationalizing explanations of an action or 
mental state of one sort or another, as in 
(15) He went to the store because there was a sale. 
(16) I believe that p because q. 
(17) She dislikes him because he’s an inveterate liar. 
I will call this second use the ‘because’ of basing, since ‘the basing relation’ is the standard term among 
epistemologists for such a ‘because’-relation when its explanandum is a belief, as in (16).6 
 This terminology will serve our purposes, but it must be admitted that it is, in some ways, less than 
ideal. After all, grounding and basing are the same metaphor! To make matters worse, some authors use 
                                                   
6  In extending the epistemologist’s term to the more general relation, I follow Neta 2019. 
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‘grounding’-talk to pick out what I will be calling basing,7 and there are times when ‘basing’-talk is a  
perfectly natural way of referring to grounding, as when we speak of the ultimate basis of morality, or when 
we say that one normative reason is more basic than another. However, ‘grounding’ and ‘basing’ each have 
enough of an entrenched history in recent analytic philosophy that I have found them to be handy labels 
for the distinction at issue here. In my experience, philosophers quickly glom onto the distinction I aim to 
be making by means of these two terms, despite their common metaphorical lineage. 
 I introduced the grounding-versus-basing distinction using the word ‘because’. However, in each 
case we can use other expressions to pick out the same relation. Indeed, it is striking that many of the 
expressions standardly used to refer to grounding can also be used to refer to basing. In the case of 
grounding, not only can we say that one fact obtains because of another, but we equally well can say that the 
first fact obtains in virtue of the other, that the first fact depends on the other fact, or that the other fact is what 
makes the first one obtain. And in the case of basing, not only can we say that I hate a certain politician 
because of certain features of his personality, but we equally well can say that I hate him in virtue of those 
features, that my hatred depends on those features, or that those features are what makes me hate him so. 
Grounding and basing are both said in many ways—and in many of the same many ways.8 
 Grounding has, of course, become an extremely hot topic in metaphysics—so hot that we are 
starting to experience a backlash from those exasperated by the revolutionary zeal of grounding’s advocates. 
My own take (Berker 2018) is that while appeals to grounding in metaphysical theorizing might, perhaps, 
be something new, appeals to grounding in ethical theorizing are not new at all—such appeals have been a 
staple of the subject for much of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (though not, of course, under that 
name). If you countenance talk of right-making, if you take hedonistic act-utilitarianism to be the view that 
acts are required because they maximize happiness, if you think accounts of value can be criticized for 
providing the wrong order-of-explanation, if you believe that there is a genuine question of whether morality 
                                                   
7  See, for example, Clark 1963. 
8  I shall, mostly for convenience’s sake, be writing as if there is a single grounding relation and a single basing relation. If it 
turns out there are multiple grounding or basing relations, much of what I go on to argue can be adapted accordingly.   
 7 
is mind-dependent—if any of these are true of you, then you’re “down with grounding.” But being down with 
grounding doesn’t require one to agree with every claim about the notion currently being put forward by 
metaphysicians working on the topic. So if you have doubts about whether grounding is transitive, or if you 
deny that grounding is a form of necessitation, or if you reject the idea that existential generalizations are 
always grounded in their instances, this doesn’t necessarily mean you’re an opponent of grounding; most 
likely it just means you disagree with certain substantive assumptions about grounding’s nature that have 
quickly become dogma among groundologists. To truly be an opponent of grounding in normative 
disciplines is to give up on explanatory claims in those disciplines all together—an almost outlandishly 
radical position, it seems to me. Indeed, that is why it is so important that quasi-realists be able to give an 
account of normative ‘grounding’-talk: the idiom of grounding suffuses our thought and talk about the 
normative. 
 Basing has an interestingly different history from grounding. There is no denying that basing has 
been a continuous subject of investigation among analytic philosophers, but that investigation has been 
fractured across a variety of disparate subfields, each of which tends to focus on only certain kinds of basing. 
I mention here four such subfields. First, a central task in the philosophy of action is to provide an account 
of the ‘because’ of basing when its explanandum is an action (see Wilson and Shpall 2012). Second, 
epistemologists have, since the Gettier era, studied the ‘because’ of basing when its explanandum is a belief 
as well as the related distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, one popular proposal 
being that doxastic justification just is propositional justification plus proper basing (see Korcz 2015). Third, 
the recent literature on the nature of inference can be seen as an investigation of one canonical way in which 
beliefs can be based on other beliefs (see Boghossian 2014). And, fourth, theorizing in the reasons-and-
rationality literature about what gets called, variously, ‘motivating reasons’, ‘operative reasons’, ‘the agent’s 
reasons’, and ‘reasons for which’ just is theorizing about the basing relation—“Agent A’s reason for f-ing 
was that p” being another way of saying, “Agent A f-ed because p” (see Alvarez 2017). 
 Because research on the ‘because’ of basing has been spread out across so many subfields, the basing 
relation has not often been studied in its full generality. As a result, even though we have at our disposal 
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some extremely sophisticated theories about, say, the basing of beliefs or the basing of actions, there are 
certain abstract questions about the nature of basing itself that are rarely asked. Here I have in mind 
questions about the logic, metaphysics, and semantics of basing that are correlates of those questions about 
the logic, metaphysics, and semantics of grounding that have been intensely debated in recent years.9 For 
example, just as we can ask whether grounding is transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive, so too can we ask 
whether basing is transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive. Just as we can ask whether grounding is a relation 
or a connective, so too can we ask whether basing is a relation or a connective. And just as we can ask 
whether instances of the grounding relation can themselves be grounded, so too can we ask whether 
instances of the basing relation can themselves be based. Similarly, many of the distinctions that are 
standardly drawn with respect to grounding have direct parallels with respect to basing. For example, just 
as it is important not to conflate joint grounding (as when the fact that p & q is grounded in the fact that p and 
the fact that q, taken together) with overdetermined grounding (as when the fact that p Ú q is grounded in the fact 
that p and the fact that q, each separately), so too is it important not to conflate joint basing (as when a belief 
that q is based on a belief that p É q and a belief that p, taken together) with overdetermined basing (as when a 
belief that p Ú q is based on a belief that p and a belief that q, each separately). Relatedly, just as we want to 
draw a distinction between partial and full grounding (as when the fact that p & q is only partially grounded in 
the fact that p, but fully grounded in that fact together with the fact that q), so too do we want to draw a 
distinction between partial and full basing (as when a belief that q is only partially based on a belief that p É 
q, but fully based on that belief together with a belief that p). And just as it is natural to distinguish between 
immediate and mediate grounding (i.e. between the relation that obtains when some things directly ground a 
thing and the relation that obtains when some things ground a thing just because they ground other things 
that in turn ground the thing), so too is it natural to distinguish between immediate and mediate basing (i.e. 
between the relation that obtains when some things serve as the direct basis for an action or mental state 
and the relation that obtains when some things serve as the basis for an action or mental state just because 
                                                   
9  Investigation of these questions about grounding was spearheaded by the widely-cited triumvirate of Fine 2012, Rosen 2010, 
and Schaffer 2009. For overview of the torrent of research that followed, see the essays in Raven forthcoming. 
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they serve as the basis for other things that in turn serve as the basis for that action or mental state). 
 Even though many of these distinctions are not, I claim, often drawn with respect to basing, and 
even though many of the general questions I mentioned have not, I maintain, been frequently asked about 
basing, there is one general question about the nature of basing that has been the subject of sustained inquiry 
in almost every mini-literature devoted to the topic. That question is this: what is the ontological category 
(or categories) of the basing relation’s relata? I have been assuming—and will continue to assume—that 
basing is a one–many relation, so that it is always a single entity that is based, but its basis could be either a 
single entity or a plurality of entities taken together. I have also been assuming—and will continue to 
assume—that the thing based is either an action or a mental state.10 These two assumptions are innocuous 
enough. However, when it comes to the ontological category of the entities that serve as bases, it is 
impossible to make any uncontentious assumptions: here discord reigns. According to mentalism, only mental 
states serve as bases. (So on this proposal, “I believe that p because q” is often shorthand for “I believe that 
p because I believe that q.”) According to factualism, it is facts that constitute the bases of our actions and 
mental states. (So on this proposal, “I believe that p because q” is often shorthand for “I believe that p 
because of the fact that q.”) According to propositionalism, our actions and mental states are based on 
propositions. According to disjunctivism (about the basing relation), in the Good Case our actions and mental 
states are based on facts, whereas in the Bad Case they are based on mental states (or, perhaps, facts about 
mental states). And there are yet more possibilities beyond these. 
 It is difficult to discuss basing without taking a stand in this debate concerning the ontology of bases. 
Hence, for the time being, I will be assuming that mentalism is correct. I do so for two reasons. First, I think 
this view is a natural one for expressivists to take: philosophers of a broadly Humean persuasion tend to 
assume it, and arguably Blackburn himself endorses it.11 Second, the proposal I shall go on to make on 
                                                   
10  Rather than, say, a fact or proposition about some action or mental state. 
11  Blackburn often characterizes a person’s moral sensibility by means of a function whose output is an attitude and whose 
input is “[a state of] belief . . . [and] more generally . . . awareness” (1984, 192) or, in later versions, “a representation” (1998, 5). 
Moreover, Blackburn clearly intends this function to tell us the basis on which the outputted attitude is held (see, for instance, 
Blackburn 1998, 99). It is only a short step from here to mentalism, at least when it comes to the bases of our attitudes.  
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expressivists’ behalf is most easily explained when one assumes mentalism. But partisans of the other views 
need not fret: my proposal is compatible with those views as well, as I shall eventually demonstrate. 
 All expressivists should be “down with basing”: they should admit that our attitudes, pro and con, 
can be based on other things. As Blackburn puts it, “there can be no question” that we often bear attitudes 
such as desire and admiration toward objects “because of their naturalistic properties” (1993, 122; see also 
1984, 182). Moreover, in Blackburn’s case in particular, there is special reason why he should allow that 
attitudes can have bases, for that idea plays a key role in his argument that expressivists can explain why it 
is a conceptual truth that normative properties supervene on underlying properties, whereas realists 
cannot.12 So not only is it independently plausible that the sorts of attitudes that expressivists take to be 
expressed by simple normative sentences such as “Kicking dogs is wrong” are held on the basis of other 
mental states, but moreover those expressivists who are convinced by Blackburn’s argument from 
supervenience for their view are committed to this idea. 
 Thus expressivists should grant that the attitudes expressed by normative sentences have bases. And 
once they do, an account of normative ‘grounding’-talk immediately suggests itself. We have two sorts of 
dependencies here. On the one hand, normative facts can depend on—in the sense of being grounded in—
further facts. On the other hand, attitudes can depend on—in the sense of being based upon—other states 
of mind. So why not take talk of the former to involve an expression of the latter?  
 This basic thought can be implemented in a variety of ways. Here I focus on one particularly 
straightforward way of developing the thought. Let us assume a simplified version of Blackburn’s 
expressivism, so that if I say, “Kicking dogs is wrong,” I express a certain sort of disapproval—call it 
‘disapprovalw’—of kicking dogs. In other words, we have: 
(E2) To (sincerely) say, “Kicking dogs is wrong,” is to express disapprovalw of kicking dogs. 
Let us also assume that ‘kick’, ‘dog’, ‘cause’, and ‘pain’ are all nonnormative terms, so that 
                                                   
12  See Blackburn 1993, 122, 137. In effect, Blackburn argues that (i) the attitudes expressed by normative sentences will only 
serve our needs and purposes if they are based on natural properties, and (ii) it is a conceptual truth that the basing relation obeys 
a constraint that is the analogue for attitudes of supervenience for properties. 
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(E3) To (sincerely) say, “Kicking dogs causes them pain,” is to express a belief that kicking dogs 
causes them pain. 
Finally, let ‘becauseg’ designate the ‘because’ of grounding, and let ‘becauseb’ designate the ‘because’ of 
basing. Then the proposal I want to consider on behalf of quasi-realists goes as follows: 
(E4) To (sincerely) say, “Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it causes them pain,” is to express 
disapprovalw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of a-belief-that-kicking-dogs-causes-them-pain. 
So if I say to you, “The wrongness of kicking dogs is grounded in the pain it causes them,” I thereby, on 
this proposal, give expression to the following complex state of mind: one in which I have an attitude of 
disapprovalw toward kicking dogs that is based on a belief that kicking dogs causes them pain. In slogan 
form: talk of normative grounding is the expression of attitudinal basing.13 
 My proposal here should not be misunderstood. I am not suggesting that it is the basing relation itself 
that is being expressed, whatever that might mean. (Can relations be expressed?) I am also not suggesting 
that it is the fact that there is a basing relation between the attitude and the belief that is being expressed. Rather, my 
suggestion is that what is being expressed is a certain complex state of mind that contains within it the attitude, 
the belief, and the obtaining of a basing relation between them. The fact that this complex state is partially 
constituted by two states of mind is no barrier to the complex itself also being state of mind. If we analyze 
preference-for-X-over-Y as greater-approval-of-X-than-of-Y, then a given state of preference will be 
composed, in part, of two separate states of approval-or-disapproval-to-a-certain-degree, but we would not 
for that reason deny that preferring is a state of mind. Similarly, in the case at hand, the fact that the attitude-
plus-belief-plus-basing conglomerate it composed, in part, of two separate states of mind is not a reason to 
deny that the conglomerate is itself a state of mind.14 
 Moreover, the fact that this complex state of mind is partially constituted by an attitude of 
disapprovalw and by a state of belief yields a nice feature of my proposal: it makes it particularly easy for 
                                                   
13  And, correspondingly, thought about normative grounding is itself attitudinal basing: to think that kicking dogs is wrong becauseg 
it causes them pain just is to disapprovew-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of a-belief-that-kicking-dogs-causes-them-pain. 
14  Nor is it a reason to deny that such a conglomerate is the sort of thing that can be expressed. Preferences can be expressed, 
as can knowledge, which, if Williamsonians are right, is a complex state of mind featuring within it a basing relation. (The 
correctness of their thesis would not bar knowledge from being expressible.) 
 12 
quasi-realists to explain why “Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it causes them pain” entails both “Kicking 
dogs is wrong” and “Kicking dogs causes them pain.”15 One cannot sincerely utter the first of these sentences 
without also harboring the mental states that would be expressed by sincere utterances of the second and 
third sentences; so to assent to the first sentence while denying the second or third is to exhibit a clashing 
set of attitudes or mental states. (I set to one side the familiar issue of whether clashing attitudes are enough 
like inconsistent beliefs to be a marker of logical failure.) Thus my proposal allows quasi-realists to account 
for an undeniable feature of the ‘because’ of grounding, namely its double factivity: the fact that “p becauseg 
q” entails both “p” and “q,” even when “p” is a normative sentence. That is one virtue of the account. 
 A second virtue of the account is that it gives quasi-realists the resources to draw all of the standard 
distinctions with respect to grounding mentioned earlier. Consider the distinction between partial and full 
grounding. Not only is this distinction theoretically useful, but it tracks a familiar distinction that that we 
make in everyday speech. Suppose I said I would return your book on Tuesday, and it is now Tuesday. 
Then a partial explanation of why I ought to return your book is that it is Tuesday, whereas (let us suppose, 
simplifying somewhat) a full explanation would cite both its being Tuesday and the fact that I told you I 
would return it then. What I am I up to when I say these things? The quasi-realist can explain the distinction 
here in terms of the analogous distinction between partial and full basing relations, like so:16 
(E5) To say, “I ought to return the book in part becauseg today is Tuesday,” is to express 
approvalo-of-returning-the-book in part becauseb of a-belief-that-today-is-Tuesday. 
(E6) To say, “I ought to return the book entirely becauseg (today is Tuesday, and I said I would 
return the book then),” is to express approvalo-of-returning-the-book entirely becauseb of a-belief-that-
today-is-Tuesday and a-belief-that-I-said-I-would-return-the-book-then, taken together. 
In a similar way, quasi-realists can account for the distinctions between (talk of) joint and overdetermined 
grounding and between (talk of) mediate and immediate grounding by appealing, on the attitude side of 
things, to the corresponding distinctions between joint and overdetermined basing and between mediate 
and immediate basing. But everyone who theorizes about the basing relation should countenance the three 
                                                   
15  Or, at least, it makes it no more difficult for them to explain these two entailments than to explain any other entailment. 
16  From this point on, I often drop the ‘(sincerely)’-qualifiers to reduce clutter. 
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distinctions mentioned here (partial vs. full basing, joint vs. overdetermined basing, immediate vs. mediate 
basing). So quasi-realists get for free the corresponding distinctions in our talk of grounding, if they adopt 
my proposal. 
 A third virtue of the proposal is how versatile it is: how easily it can be adapted to other forms of 
expressivism (beyond Blackburn’s) and to other forms of dependence (beyond simple normative-on-
nonnormative dependence). For instance, the proposal can be readily applied to Gibbard-style expressivism, 
since planning states have bases: we plan things for reasons. Thus a Gibbardian can hold that 
(E7) To say, “Packing now is the thing to do becauseg otherwise we will miss the train,” is to 
express a-state-of-planning-to-pack-now becauseb of a-belief-that-otherwise-we-will-miss-the-train. 
Even more importantly, the proposal can easily be adapted to handle claims of normative-on-normative 
dependence, in addition to claims of normative-on-nonnormative dependence. Suppose that 
(E8) To say, “That outcome is bad,” is to express disapprovalb of that outcome. 
Then a Blackburn-style quasi-realist can insist that 
(E9) To say, “Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it leads to bad outcomes,” is to express disapprovalw-
of-kicking-dogs becauseb of one’s-disapprovalb-of-the-outcomes-to-which-it-leads. 
The proposal can also be modified to handle claims of second-order dependence, if we allow that there is 
such a thing as second-order basing. Suppose a critic of quasi-realism were willing to grant that quasi-realists 
can consistently accept 
(18) Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it causes them pain 
but thought instead that quasi-realists are committed to endorsing 
(19) Our love of dogs makesg it the case that (kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it causes them pain). 
A quasi-realist could then retort that, on her view, 
(E10) To say,  “Our love of dogs makesg it the case that (kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it causes 
them pain),” is to express (disapprovalw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of a-belief-that-doing-so-causes-them-
pain) becauseb of a-belief-that-we-love-dogs. 
Moreover, our quasi-realist could insist, she does not possess this basing structure among her attitudes. So 
she does not endorse (19), nor is she required by her acceptance of quasi-realism to do so. 
 This last point reveals a fourth virtue of the proposal being offered here: it allows quasi-realists to 
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hold onto Blackburn’s quietist story about why quasi-realists are not committed to the mind-dependence of 
the normative. My proposal tells us the state of mind expressed by statements of mind-dependence, whether 
they be statements of dependence-at-the-second-order on our mental states such as (19) or statements of 
dependence-at-the-first-order on our mental states such as 
(20) Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg I disapprovew of it. 
And in either case, the commitment expressed by such a statement is an engaged, ethical position internal 
to moral thought, not a disengaged, purely-metaethical position that takes a stand on ethical practice from 
a “sideways, theoretical perspective” (Blackburn 1993, 177).17 So quasi-realists can complain that (20) is a 
repugnant first-order moral claim to which they are opposed, because the state of mind it expresses is 
despicable. The details of this complaint will differ from the details of the complaint lodged by Blackburn 
when he was working with his counterfactual way of understanding (20): rather than expressing our 
opposition to attitudes of disapprovalw toward kicking dogs that disappear in certain counterfactual 
scenarios, we now will be inveighing against attitudes of disapprovalw toward kicking dogs that are held in 
the actual world on a given basis. But the heart of Blackburn’s story about why quasi-realists are not mind-
dependence theorists can remain the same. 
 Which brings me to the fifth and final virtue of the proposal that I shall mention: how 
metaphysically lightweight it is. The proposal offers quasi-realists an account of normative ‘grounding’-talk 
(and other related idioms) which makes use of no materials other than the usual ones employed by quasi-
realists (“desire-like” attitudes, an expression relation, etc.) plus the basing relation. Moreover, as already 
explained, quasi-realists should be fine with the idea that the attitudes expressed by normative sentences 
have bases—that they are held for reasons. And to say that these attitudes are held for reasons is not to say 
that the reasons for which they are held are good or bad reasons. So—I would claim—I am not appealing 
to anything normative in providing an account of what we are up to when we engage in normative 
‘grounding’-talk. Therefore the picture I present here is fully compatible with the naturalistic ambitions of 
                                                   
17  Hence (19) is first-order in one sense (it falls within normative ethics) but second-order in another sense (it concerns a second-
order dependency). 
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quasi-realist expressivism—assuming, that is, that a naturalistic story can be told about mental states and 
their bases, which those with naturalistic ambitions owe us anyway. 
 Where does this leave us? I have been proposing that quasi-realists view normative ‘grounding’-talk 
as the expression of attitudinal basing, and I have been pointing out the many virtues of this account, 
including its ability to explain the factivity of grounding, the ease with which it recovers standard distinctions 
made with respect to grounding, its adaptability to many forms of expressivism and to many forms of 
dependence, its compatibility with quietist accounts of why normativity can be mind-independent for 
expressivists, and the metaphysical austerity of the materials with which it works. So this proposal has a lot 
going for it. It is, if I may be so bold, what quasi-realists should say about explanatory talk in the normative 
realm.18 
3. A Problem 
Which is not to say that the proposal being broached here is problem free. Indeed, this proposal (and others 
like it) face a number of potential challenges. 
 Some of these challenges are instances of more familiar worries for quasi-realist expressivism. For 
instance, how do we extend my proposal to negated normative ‘grounding’-claims? And is it problematic if 
we end up giving differing accounts of ‘grounding’-talk when at least one relatum is normative and of 
‘grounding’-talk when neither relatum is normative? Other challenges are unique to this proposal. For 
instance, what are we to make of cases in which an attitude appears to be held on a testimonial basis (or on 
                                                   
18  Indeed, the puzzle, if anything, is why Blackburn didn’t endorse this account of normative ‘dependence’-talk, given what he 
does say about how expressivists are to explain the supervenience of the normative on the nonnormative (1993, 122, 137). It was 
those passages that inspired me, while teaching Blackburn’s quasi-realism five years ago, to think up my proposal. 
 More recently, I was grieved to discover that C. S. Jenkins (2005, 206–7) and Neil Sinclair (2008, 264–65) in passing make 
somewhat similar proposals. So they deserve credit for being the first ones to put forward a proposal of roughly this sort. However, 
there are important differences between their versions of the proposal and mine. Instead of my appeal to the basing relation, Jenkins 
speaks of “the standards” according to which we hold attitudes such as moral censure, whereas Sinclair prefers to say that our 
attitudes are “responses” to features of the things toward which they are directed. Moreover, Jenkins and Sinclair combine what I 
take to be our central insight with other elements that are in tension with that insight. After appealing to (the nonnormative notion 
of) a person’s standards when formulating a proposal much mine, Jenkins slides into using ‘standards’ in a normative sense when 
she (mistakenly, in my opinion) summarizes her proposal as follows: “In asking what makes it the case that p [for a normative ‘p’], 
we are asking what standards have to be met in order for p to be correctly asserted” (2005, 207). She then goes on to identify what 
makes something the case with that thing’s “sufficient conditions,” which conflates grounding and necessitation. Sinclair, on the 
other hand, combines a proposal much like mine for talk of mind-dependence (2008, §2) with a version of Blackburn’s mistaken 
counterfactual account for talk of mind-independence (ibid., §3), which strikes me as an odd mixture of views. 
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the basis of an inference in which the premises don’t serve as grounds of the conclusion), but in which it is 
implausible to attribute a belief in the corresponding grounding claim to the holder of that attitude? 
 These are all significant worries. But I will not be addressing them here, for two reasons. First, I 
have been presenting my proposal in a way that largely abstracts away from the details of particular 
expressivist proposals, and addressing some of these concerns requires going into the specifics of how a 
quasi-realist should think about negation, inference, the attitudes expressed by normative sentences, etc. 
Second, I have been presenting only one way of developing my general thought that quasi-realists should 
take normative ‘grounding’-talk to be the expression of attitudinal basing, and some ways of replying to 
these objections involve varying that proposal so as to complicate its letter but preserve its spirit.19 
 Instead, I want to focus on another potential problem for my proposal that hews closer to the sorts 
of issues we have been considering so far. My proposal allows quasi-realists to tell a natural, expressivist-
friendly story about many ‘because’-sentences. Many, but not all. Consider again the Euthyphro question: 
“Is it wrong to kick dogs because I disapprovew of it, or do I disapprovew of it because it is wrong?” The 
whole point of quasi-realist accounts of (thought and talk about) mind-independence is to answer the 
Euthyphro question in the right way. However, that involves not just denying the first horn of this dilemma 
but also assenting to its second horn. We have given quasi-realist expressivists the resources—once they wheel 
in their preferred account of negation—to explain what we are up to when we say, 
(21) It’s not the case that (kicking dogs is wrong because I disapprovew of it). 
But we have not yet said how they can explain what we are doing when we say, 
(22) I disapprovew of kicking dogs because doing so is wrong. 
What could this sentence mean, for an expressivist? 
 It is important to notice that, although (21) features the ‘because’ of grounding, (22) features the 
                                                   
19  For instance, one way of responding to the worry about attitudes held on the basis of testimony or non-ground-tracking 
inference is to revise my proposal so that ‘grounding’-talk only expresses complex states of mind featuring certain sorts of basing 
relations, rather than any basing relation whatsoever. (Maybe only non-inferential, non-testimonial basing is at issue, or maybe only 
basing-on-the-natural-properties-of-objects.) Another way of replying is to deny that the problematic sort of basing can occur, once 
we focus on the specific variety of attitude that expressivists take to be expressed by simple normative sentences, with its special 
connection to action, etc. (Maybe that sort of attitude cannot be based on testimony, and this is why there is something problematic 
about normative testimony.) Elsewhere, in work in progress, I explore in greater detail the objections that I here set to one side. 
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‘because’ of basing. (It is not as if (22) offers an alternative to functionalist accounts of mental states such as 
disapproval.) In other words, the Euthyphro question does not employ a univocal sense of ‘because’: its first 
half concerns grounding, its second half basing.20 Thus, although my account of normative ‘grounding’-talk 
commits quasi-realists to a certain way of reading (21) (given what they say about negation), my account 
does not, on its own, commit them to any particular account of (22). Nevertheless it is difficult to endorse 
my proposal without understanding (22) in a certain way. 
 Recall that we are right now assuming mentalism, so that only mental states can serve as bases of 
attitudes. (Soon we shall discharge that assumption.) Given mentalism, (22) must be taken by expressivists 
to be shorthand for: 
(23) I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I believe that doing so is wrong.21 
(23) contains two embedded sentences attributing to oneself a certain mental state: one to the left of the 
‘becauseb’, and the other to the right. Let us consider what each of these sentences comes to, for an 
expressivist, when said on its own. The embedded sentence on the left is easy: 
(E11) To say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs,” is to express one’s belief that one disapprovesw of kicking 
dogs. 
Moreover, for Blackburnian expressivists of the sort we are now considering, the standard way of handling 
the embedded sentence on the right is as follows:22 
(E12) To say, “I believe that kicking dogs is wrong,” is to express one’s belief that one disapprovesw of 
kicking dogs. 
Hence each of the embedded sentences, if said by itself, expresses the same state of mind. So, when we put 
(E11) and (E12) together, it is difficult to resist concluding that 
(E13) To say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I believe that doing so is wrong,” is to 
express one’s belief that (one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs). 
                                                   
20  This raises the interesting issue, not often discussed, of why it might be thought that the Euthyphro question presents us with 
exclusive and exhaustive options, as would be needed if that question constitutes a genuine dilemma. 
21  Strictly speaking, it is compatible with mentalism that (22) is shorthand for a sentence in which the explanans is a mental 
state other than belief with the same content, such as “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I have an intuition that doing so is wrong.” 
However, mentalists who are expressivists cannot provide that gloss for (22)—one of the whole points of the expressivist program is to 
avoid appealing to a faculty of intuition in one’s moral epistemology. 
22  See Blackburn 1993, 184–85; Blackburn 1998, 70; Rosen 1998, 393–94; Schroeder 2010, 88. 
 18 
However, this is a terrible result! In uttering (22), I clearly am not attributing to myself a self-based attitude.23 
 The obvious response is to renounce mentalism and try to avoid the result by endorsing an 
alternative account of the ontological category of bases. Let us focus on how matters proceed if we accept 
propositionalism instead of mentalism. (Parallel issues arise for factualism, disjunctivism, etc.) There are two 
issues to keep track of here. The first is whether it is even possible to offer a version of my quasi-realist 
account of ‘grounding’-talk when we assume propositionalism. The second is whether that account gets into 
trouble when we attempt to extend it to ‘basing’-talk. 
 Concerning the first issue, here is the obvious way of adapting my proposal to propositionalism: 
(E14) To say, “Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it causes them pain,” is to express disapprovalw-of-
kicking-dogs becauseb of the-proposition-that-kicking-dogs-causes-them-pain. 
This propositionalist variant of my proposal possesses many of the virtues I cited for its mentalist cousin: it 
is metaphysically lightweight; it allows quasi-realists to go quietist about talk of mind-dependence; it is 
readily adaptable to non-Blackburnian forms of expressivism; it allows quasi-realists to make sense of various 
distinctions with regard to ‘grounding’-talk by appealing to analogues of those distinctions with regard to 
basing. But with two of my cited virtues, complications arise. 
 First, although it is clear how quasi-realists can explain, given (E14), why “Kicking dogs is wrong 
becauseg it causes them pain” entails “Kicking dogs is wrong,” it is less obvious why that first sentence entails 
“Kicking dogs causes them pain.” Less obvious, but not entirely unobvious: if one sincerely utters “Kicking 
dogs is wrong becauseg it causes them pain,” it follows from (E14) that one has a certain attitude that is based 
on a certain nonnormative proposition. So, plausibly, one is committed to that nonnormative proposition 
being true, and hence committed to not believing its negation. 
 Second, and more pressingly, how to extend the propositionalist version of my proposal to (talk of) 
normative-on-normative dependence is a delicate matter. The most flatfooted way of doing so would be to 
propose that  
                                                   
23  I find it fascinating that this problem for quasi-realists is similar to the old puzzle for Kantians, raised by Ross (1930, ch. 1) 
and others, about how it can be our duty to do our duty for duty’s sake. I find this fascinating because quasi-realists are usually 
classified as part of the sentimentalist tradition, so quasi-realists and Kantians make for odd bedfellows.  
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(E15) To say, “Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it leads to bad outcomes,” is to express disapprovalw-
of-kicking-dogs becauseb of the-proposition-that-kicking-dogs-leads-to-bad-outcomes. 
But it is not clear that expressivists can make sense of the notion of a normative proposition, much less make 
sense of what it is to express an attitude that is based on such a proposition. Expressivism offers us an account 
of thought with normative content and of talk with normative content, but expressivism—at least as it is 
traditionally construed—does not theorize about the thing itself, normative content. However, talk of 
normative-on-normative dependence is everywhere: to give up on providing an account of such talk would 
be a disastrous result for quasi-realists. So I think the best option for quasi-realist propositionalists is to resist 
the most flatfooted way of generalizing (E14) to cases of normative-on-normative dependence and to propose 
the following instead of (E15): 
(E16) To say, “Kicking dogs is wrong becauseg it leads to bad outcomes,” is to express one’s-
disapprovalw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of the-proposition-that-one-disapprovesb-of-the-outcomes-to-which-
kicking-dogs-leads. 
This proposal leads to an unfortunate lack of unity in one’s theorizing about ‘dependence’-speech: the 
account of normative-on-normative dependency talk is not exactly parallel to the account of normative-on-
nonnormative dependency talk. But I see no way around that result, for propositionalist quasi-realists. 
 We are now in a position to turn to the second issue facing quasi-realists who accept 
propositionalism: whether their variant of my account of ‘grounding’-talk gets them into trouble when we 
consider ‘basing’-talk. And, indeed, here there is once again trouble. Consider our target sentence: 
(22) I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb doing so is wrong. 
We don’t want to provide an account of (22)’s meaning that is analogous to (E15), namely: 
(E17) To say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb doing so is wrong,” is to express one’s belief 
that (one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of the-proposition-that-kicking-dogs-is-wrong), 
because then we are appealing to an attitude based on a normative proposition, which is a mysterious thing 
for a quasi-realist. So it would appear that our only option is to provide an account of (22)’s meaning that 
is analogous to (E16), namely: 
(E18) To say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb doing so is wrong,” is to express one’s belief 
that (one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of the-proposition-that-one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs). 
However, now disaster has struck: we are once again forced to say that utterances of (22) express a belief 
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that one has a self-based attitude. So propositionalist quasi-realists fare no better than mentalist quasi-realists 
when it comes to providing an account of (22). In order for propositionalists to have a viable account of talk 
of normative-on-normative grounding, they must embrace a proposal about such talk that is close to a 
notational variant of the mentalist’s account of talk of normative-on-normative grounding. That in turn 
forces them to embrace a proposal about talk of attitude-on-normative-content basing that is close to a 
notational variant of the mentalist’s account of talk of attitude-on-(belief-with)-normative-content basing. 
Hence both sorts of quasi-realists are saddled with almost the same implausible result. 
 Thus, in the end, moving from mentalism to an alternative view about the ontological category of 
bases is no help with our problem: either that move causes problems elsewhere (by depriving quasi-realists 
of an account of normative-on-normative dependency talk), or it returns us to the same problem, in slightly 
different form. So let us go back to assuming mentalism and consider what options are left for quasi-realists. 
Another response is to resist my earlier claim that (E11) and (E12) commit the quasi-realist to (E13). Perhaps 
instead of (E13), the quasi-realist should propose 
(E19) To (sincerely) say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb doing so is wrong,” is to express 
one’s-belief-that-one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of one’s-disapprovalw-of-kicking-dogs.24 
However, this proposal is not particularly plausible, for several reasons. First, it takes a sentence that appears 
to concern the basis one’s attitude of disapprovalw and instead makes it have to do with the basis of one’s 
belief that one has this attitude of disapprovalw. But these two things can pull apart. For instance, suppose I 
believe-that-I-disapprovew-of-kicking-dogs because (and only because) I find myself adverse to kicking dogs. 
If I am convinced of my own moral rectitude, I might also believe-that-(I-disapprovew-of-kicking-dogs-
becauseb-doing-so-is-wrong). And yet, this last belief of mine could be mistaken. (Maybe in fact I disapprovew 
of kicking dogs because my wife is a dog person and I want to curry her favor.) In such a scenario, surely I 
can sincerely—yet mistakenly—utter the words “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb doing so is wrong.” 
(E13) allows this. But (E19) does not. 
 A second problem is that (E19) does not naturally generalize to other types of ‘basing’-sentences. For 
                                                   
24  Zach Gabor and Bart Streumer each independently made this suggestion. 
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instance, consider 
(24) I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I disapprovew of violence. 
 The direct analogue of (E19) for this sentence would be 
(E20) To say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I disapprovew of violence,” is to express 
one’s-belief-that-one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of one’s-disapprovalw-of-violence. 
But this is an implausible expressivist treatment of (24): why the asymmetry in how the two mentioned 
attitudes are handled?25 A much more natural proposal is 
 (E21) To say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I disapprovew of violence,” is to express 
one’s belief that (one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb one-disapprovesw-of-violence). 
However, (E21) is the straightforward way of generalizing (E13) to (24). So once again we are led back to (E13) 
as the treatment of “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb doings so is wrong” that is forced upon 
expressivists. 
 I can see only one last possible response to our problem: maybe quasi-realists should deny that they 
need to tell a story on which it makes sense for us to say (22). On this line of thought, one should never say, 
“I disapprovew of kicking dogs because doing so is wrong.” Instead, one should cite the various properties 
of dog-kickings that, in one’s view, make that action wrong: “I disapprovew of kicking dogs because it causes 
them pain, because it is inhumane, and so on.” So, according to this line of thought, the proper reaction to 
the Euthyphro question is to view it as presenting us with a false dilemma: it is neither the case that it is 
wrong to kick dogs because we disapprovew of it nor the case that we disapprovew of doing so because it is 
wrong; instead, we disapprovew of that activity because of various other properties it has.26 
 I can see the appeal of this response, but I think that it ultimately does not succeed. I offer two 
preliminary points and then my main rebuttal. First preliminary point: the claim being made here is not 
that it is never acceptable to say that one has an attitude of disapprovalw toward an action becauseb that action has some-
normative-property-or-other, nor that it is never acceptable to say that one has some-attitude-or-other toward an action 
                                                   
25  Matters are even worse if we consider the sentence “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb I disapprovew of kicking dogs.” 
Surely this does not express one’s-belief-that-one-disapprovesw-of-kicking-dogs becauseb of one’s-disapprovalw-of-kicking-dogs! 
26  Both Allan Gibbard and Gideon Rosen have suggested this reply to me in conversation. 
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becauseb that action is wrong. Everyone should be fine with the sentences “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb 
kicking dogs leads to bad outcomes” and “I’m surprised that you kicked that dog becauseb kicking dogs is 
wrong.” The problem, rather, is supposed to arise only when the attitude on the left-hand side of the 
‘becauseb’ is precisely the one that expressivists claim to be expressed by sincere utterances of the normative 
sentence on the right-hand side. However, it should strike us as a little puzzling why the proposed ban only 
goes into effect under these precise conditions. Apparently it is fine to talk of attitudes other than 
disapprovalw being based on wrongness, and also fine to talk of disapprovalw being based on normative 
properties other than wrongness, but not fine to talk of disapprovalw being based on wrongness. But why 
would that be so? This all seems rather convenient. 
 Second preliminary point: advocates of this response are presenting us with their own false 
dilemma. “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb it causes them pain” is not incompatible with “I 
disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb it is wrong.” One way for them both to be true is for the first to be an 
instance of mediate basing and the second to be an instance of immediate basing: maybe my-belief-that-
kicking-dogs-causes-them-pain is the basis of my-belief-that-kicking-dogs-is-wrong, which in turn is the 
immediate basis of my-disapprovalw-of-kicking-dogs, so that the attitude in question is directly based on the 
second belief and indirectly based on the first. Hence the real issue is not whether it is sometimes okay to 
say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb it causes them pain”; all parties can agree to that. The issue is 
rather whether it is never okay to say, “I disapprovew of kicking dogs becauseb it is wrong”—and, more 
importantly, whether its never being okay to utter these words gets quasi-realists off the hook. 
 Which brings me to the main problem with this response: it does not in fact get quasi-realists off the 
hook, because the propriety of uttering these words is entirely beside the point. Even if it is never alright to 
say (22), quasi-realists still owe us an explanation of what we would be doing were we to say that sentence. 
Moreover, the quasi-realist explanation we have been led to of what we would be doing were we to say that 
sentence is patently inadequate. If indeed I should always abstain from telling others that I disapprovew of 
kicking dogs becauseb it is wrong, the reason I should abstain is clearly not that otherwise I would be 
reporting that I have a self-based attitude. 
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 So I think we are left with a problem. I have been making the case that viewing normative 
‘grounding’-talk as the expression of attitudinal basing is an extremely promising quasi-realist account of 
the ‘because’ of grounding (and related idioms). I see, however, no way of extending that proposal into a 
viable account of the ‘because’ of basing (and related idioms). My conclusion: quasi-realists have a problem 
with the Euthyphro contrast after all, just not where we initially expected it to be.27 
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